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Panipat, famous for its battles, is a nondescript textile town 80 kilometers north of Delhi which you can pass through on NH1 (Mughal Shah Rah) without noticing anything remarkable.   But this is a place replete with history, where 3 medieval battles which altered the fate of India, were fought. In fact, there were 3 recent movies involving some of the dramatis personae who figured in these 3 battles: - “Jodha Akbar”, “Bajirao Mastani “and “Panipat”.  The place also has a legendary significance as one of the 5 villages which the Pandavas sought from their Kaurava cousins to settle the dispute between them. Kurukshetra, where Lord Krishna expounded the Bhagavad Gita to Arjuna, is just 40 kilometers away and Tarain, where Prithviraj Chauhan, the last Hindu king of Delhi lost his life and kingdom to Mohamed Ghori in 1192, is also within strategic distance. 

National Highway No.1 (Mughal Shah Rah)

Memories of the Third Battle of Panipat (1761) had evoked a bitter sense of loss among my “Chitpavan Brahmin“ collegemates - Ranade, Patwardhan, Kelkar, Phadke, Bapat, Gadgil, Bhave, Dixit, Sathe, Apte, Thatte, Karandikar, Kale, Gokale, … .  at Poona’s College of Engineering. Several had lost their ancestors at Panipat to Abdali’s rampaging horde. The issues relating to the catastrophic defeat used to be discussed animatedly, even after 200 years. Recently, in a conversation with the great environmentalist Dr. Madhav Gadgil, a Chitpavan, he rightly attributed the defeat to the large number of non-combatant pilgrims that had accompanied the Maratha army, all the way from Poona. To me, this battle was a game-changer in Indian history and I therefore devoted to it a chapter in my book  “Decisive Battles, Strategic Leaders” published by Penguin-Partridge in 2014.  I was fortunate to visit many of the battle fields I wrote about, and understand the topography, for which my education as a civil engineer stood me in good stead. Site visits are quite different from studying two dimensional maps, however detailed, since utilizing the key physical features of the land,.. rivers, canals, marshland, forests, hills, even slopes/gradients,…  is the real mark of all great commanders.  Traversing the terrain between Panipat Fort in the West and the Yamuna River to the East, where all three battles were fought, one realizes that any army intending to go South or North would be forced to use this12 kilometer gap which is a fairly level plain and ideally suited for rapid cavalry movement. The strategic location of this Panipat gap is thus similar to that of Belgium which was called the “Cockpit of Europe” where many European powers contended over centuries.

After the Battle of Tarain in 1192, Delhi had been ruled successively by the Slave Dynasty, Khiljis, Tughlaks, Sayyids and Lodis. Some of the more familiar names are Qutubudin Aibak (Qutub Minar), Raziya Sultana,Allaudin Khilji (of Padmavat ill-fame), and Mohamed bin Tughlak.  Around 1500, Central Asia after Genghis Khan and Timur, was in a state of churn, with tribal chieftains winning and losing kingdoms, but the administrative/military weakness in Delhi resulting from Ibrahim Lodi’s chaotic 9 year reign, soon provided an opportunity for Babur, their lineal descendant, to conquer territories once held by his ancestors. The First and Second Battles of Panipat are closely connected because they resulted in establishing Mughal rule in India in the 16th century.

The First Battle of Panipat (1526)

The First Battle of Panipat was fought on 24th January 1526, between Zahirudin Mohamed Babur of Kabul, leading an army of Central Asian freebooters and Ibrahim Lodi, Sultan of Delhi. Babur had led an adventurous roller-coaster life since he was orphaned at the age of 11, successively inheriting, losing and winning kingdoms - Ferghana, Samarkand, Kandahar and Kabul. He raided Punjab in 1519 and returned there in 1525 at the invitation of Daulat Khan Lodi, rebel kinsman of Ibrahim Lodi. Babur enjoyed the support of the Persian Shah, Ismail and of Turkish Ottoman Sultan Selim I, who sent cannons and expert gunners to aid him. (The Ottomans were the pioneers in the use of Cannons.  In 1453, the huge Ottoman guns had demolished the hitherto impregnable 3-Tier walls of Constantinople, leading to the fall of the great metropolis).

At 43, Babur (meaning, Tiger) was in the prime of life and led 12000 expert horse archers armed with the Double Curved Composite Bow with a range of 300 yards, 1000 musketeers and surprise, 25 mobile cannons!. Moving south through Punjab, Babur encamped at Panipat and dug ditches and trenches all the way east to the Yamuna. He reinforced this barrier with felled trees, timber palisades and placed his 700 carts end to end, with chains linking them. (This technique was pioneered by Protestant Hussite general Jan Ziska in Eastern Europe a hundred years before, in order to to stem the charge of heavily armed knights). There were openings in between the wagons for his cannon, embrasures for musketeers to fire at the enemy and sally ports for his cavalry to charge out. Babur commanded the centre while sons Humayun and Kamran Mirza led  the wings in the Turkish style of tulugma divisional formation, which was highly flexible. Having a much smaller army, Babur started the battle in defensive mode, planning to counter attack at the opportune time. 

Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, who had succeeded his able father Sikander in 1517, was a capricious, cruel, divisive despot and faced serious dissensions among his own turbulent Afghan nobles.  There was also a third force in North-West India,  the powerful Rajput Confederacy led by Maharana Sangram Singh Sisodia, ruler of Mewar (Udaipur), who was better known as Rana Sangha. Thus three powerful forces confronted each other in a triangular fight for supremacy in North India, just like in England in 1066, when newly crowned King Harold Godwinson, Duke William of Normandy and Harold Hardraada of Norway vied for domination.  Rana Sangha stood ready and waiting, hoping like Duke William, that his two adversaries would knock each other out. At Hastings, William’s Normans defeated Harold Godwinson’s Anglo-Saxon army(much depleted after their pyrrhic victory over Hardraada’s Vikings}, but Babur after Panipat, went on to defeat Rana Sangha at Khanwa.            

The Lodi army advanced north from Delhi along the west bank of the Yamuna with 30,000 cavalry, 40,000 foot soldiers and its main weapon, 350 war elephants. Elephants were the tanks of ancient warfare and were deadly when used intelligently. (Alexander the Great, had successfully faced charging Indian elephants of Persian Emperor Darius’ army at Arbela in 331 BC and later at Jhelum against Porus; and  Carthagenian leader Hannibal,  had moved from Spain through the Pyrenees and crossed the formidable Rhone River and towering Alps taking with him 35 African elephants, to attack Rome in 218 BC. Uniquely, elephants continued to be used in battle in India even at Plassey as late as 1757, probably because the Indian pachyderm was very intelligent and could be trained to perform complex tasks).

General Battle Plan for the First Battle of Panipat:- Lodis Army in Blue and the Mughals in Red. River Yamuna is denoted in blue in the top right corner (north east).  Panipat Fort is denoted in grey in the top left (north west)

Lodi intended to use his elephants to bulldoze Babur’s army into submission, but the beasts baulked at the impenetrable West to East wagon/trench/palisade barrier through which emanated a barrage of musket fire and cannon balls, accompanied by unfamiliar and deafening noise of gunpowder explosions. The terrified beasts milled around and stampeded, trampling horsemen and foot soldiers and created utter confusion in the Lodi ranks. At the perfect moment, Babur’s horsemen charged into the melee and struck down Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, ensuring total victory. Lodi’s Afghans fled in panic to Delhi and beyond. Ibrahim Lodi was buried in Panipat town and not in Lodi Gardens, Delhi, where the other Lodis are buried.  

Death of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi from “Baburnama”

But Babur still had to deal with the formidable Rajput chiefs of Harauli, Sirohi, Dungarpur and the Rathores of Marwar, all led by Rana Sangha grandson of legendary Rana Khumba of Chittor. Apart from the united Rajputs, the forces of the Raja of Chanderi, Raja Shiladitya of East Malwa, Muslim Rajput Mewatis under Hassan Khan and Afghans under Mohamed, brother of Ibrahim Lodi joined the Rana.  On 16th March 1527, the armies clashed at Khanwa, near Fatehpur Sikri with Babur again adopting the “Tulugma” divisional formation with a wagon barricade in front, as at Panipat against the Rana’s 80,000 strong army. With such a powerful army backing him, the Rana was confident of victory, and Babur in desperation swore a public oath to eschew liquor for ever, if Allah granted him victory. It was touch and go, till at the critical juncture, Raja Shiladitya turned traitor. Babur’s cannons and horsemen did the rest. Grievously wounded but still defiant, the Rana retired to Chittor. He was poisoned by his own adherents who were unwilling to continue the conflict. It is a travesty of fate that he is not remembered today, though he was probably a greater (and certainly a more successful) general than his more famous grandson, Rana Pratap.  Gifted with an uncanny ability to bring together diverse forces under his banner, he had won a long string of victories against the Lodis and the Sultans of Gujarat and Malwa, during which he lost an eye and was scarred with 80 wounds!  (Incidentally, Saint-Poet Meerabai, ardent devotee of Lord Krishna, was married to his eldest son Bhoj Raj, who had predeceased his father. After Rana Sangha’s death, she was persecuted by orthodox members of her husband’s family and had to flee to Dwaraka. Meera’s bhajans of the Bhakti genre like “Aeri mai to Prem Diwani mera” and “Jo Tum Toro Piya” as sung by MS Subalakshmi, Lata Mangeshkar, Vani Jairaman, Shreya Ghosal, are still popular throughout India, even after 500 years.)

 We know of Rana Sangha’s heroic deeds largely from Annals of Rajpootana collated in 1829 by Col. James Tod, who was the British  Resident at the Mewar court. He was sacked for being too sympathetic to the valiant Rajputs whom he favourably compared to the clansmen of the Scottish Highlands. While the Rajputs retreated to their strongholds after their defeat at Khanwa, the Afghans and Lodi supporters were pursued eastwards to Bihar/Bengal by Babur’s general, Mir Baki (builder of Babri Masjid, Ayodhya) and Babur was firmly set on the throne. His autobiography “Baburnama” written in the Central Asian language, Chugutai, describes these events in detail, along with beautiful paintings.      

Humayun who succeeded his father Babur in 1530, faced intrigues by his brothers and opposition from the restless Afghans in the east. Farid Khan, a brilliant Lodi officer, led the Afghans and became a major threat to Humayun and the Mughals (as Babur’s dynasty came to be called).  After a couple of catastrophic defeats at Chausa and Kanauj, Humayun had to flee from Delhi in 1540. Sher Shah Suri, as Farid Khan now called himself, ascended the Delhi throne and proved to be a ruler with considerable political acumen and military skills… and a visionary who built the Grand Trunk Road (Shah Rah). Humayun’s son Jalaludin Mohamed Akbar was born in Sind in 1542 during his father’s exile.

Sher Shah Suri  was killed in an explosion during the siege of Kalinjar in 1545. His heirs were unable to retain the Sultanate and Humayan was back on the throne of Delhi in 1555.  An incorrigible bibliophile, Humayun fell down the library stairs while carrying a pile of books and was killed, leaving the Sultanate to his 13 year old son, Akbar. Humayun is buried in a magnificent tomb built in Delhi by his wife Hamida Banu Begum. “Humayun nama” in Persian, chronicling his tempestuous life, was written by his sister Gulbadan Begum. 

Humayun's Tomb, Delhi

Akbar had an able and loyal guardian, Behram Khan, but several rival claimants were on the prowl. Sher Shah’s successors who were reorganizing in Bihar/Bengal, turned to their capable and ambitious Hindu minister, Hemu Bhargava, to win back the throne of Delhi. And that led to the second battle of Panipat. 

The Second Battle of Panipat, 1556

The Second Battle of Panipat was fought on 5th November, 1556. While Behram Khan and his young ward Akbar, were engaged in quelling disturbances in Punjab, Hemu led his mixed Hindu-Afghan army westwards brushing aside the fragmented Mughal forces which confronted him and captured Agra Fort. He then defeated the powerful army sent against him by Behram Khan at Tughlaqabad on the outskirts of Delhi. Entering the capital , he crowned himself Raja Hemchandra Vikramaditya (invoking memories of the great Gupta Emperor, Chandragupta II, Vikramaditya).  Hemu then marched north along the west bank of the Yamuna, while Akbar’s army marched south from Jalandhar. At Panipat, Akbar occupied the same south-facing position as his grandfather Babur in 1526. The Mughal left and right were led by Abdullah Khan Uzbek and Sikander Khan Uzbek respectively with Ali Quli Khan in the centre, while Behram Khan kept Akbar safely with the rearguard.

Maharaja Hemachandra Vikramaditya (Hemu)

Bust of Hemu at Panipat

Hemu’s army had 400 elephants while the Mughals’ main strength was their cannons, as usual.  Hemu led his centre in full armour, an imposing figure on his giant elephant “Hawai”. His nephew Ramya led the Hindu contingent on the left and Shadi Khan Kakka commanded the Afghans on the right. Initially, Hemu’s forces had the clear advantage on all fronts and the Mughals were pushed back, but they continued to rain missiles at Hemu, towering in the forefront of the action.  Hemu’s  armoured elephants wreaked havoc among the Mughals since Behram Khan had not (unlike Babur) put up defensive barricades to break their charge. As victory seemed within Hemu’s grasp, a chance arrow penetrated the visor of his helmet and hit him in the eye. The Moghuls captured him and carried him to Behram Khan who asked his ward to decapitate him. When Akbar demurred, Behram himself cut off Hemu’s head. With their charismatic leader slain, Hemu’s army disintegrated. All organized opposition to Akbar ceased when Adil Shah Suri, nephew of Sher Shah was killed in Bihar in 1557. As a result of this battle, the Mughals realized the immense value of trained elephants and used them in all their future wars.   But, “What if Hemu had won? Would the Afghans have continued to support a Hindu, Hemu, in his quest for the throne of Delhi?”  Had that happened, the Mughal Empire would have ended in just 30 years and there would have been a Hindu ruler back on the throne of Delhi, after over 300 years since Prithviraj’s debacle at Tarain!

Akbar soon threw off Behram Khan’s tutelage and proved to be a capable and inclusive ruler. He may be considered the real founder of the Mughal Empire, the first since Asoka’s Mauryan Empire in 250 BC to occupy extensive territories south of the Narmada River. It flourished for two centuries because relative peace prevailed and no external invader crossed the Himalayas from 1526 till after the death of Akbar’s great grandson Aurangzeb in 1707. India prospered under the early Mughals and enjoyed 20% of the World GDP, with flourishing agriculture and exporting diamonds, muslin and other textiles as far away as Europe. Akbar’s efficient administrative system is described in Abul Fazl’s “Aini Akbari”. His religious tolerance and marriage to Amber (Jaipur) princess, Jodha secured for him the support of many Rajputs including her brother Raja Durgadas and his Kacchawa clan. Jodha was given the title Mariam-e Zamana by Akbar and their son Salim succeeded his father as Emperor Jehangir. Durgadas’son Raja Man Singh, in 1576, even led the Mughal armies against iconic Maharana Pratap of Mewar (grandson of Rana Sangha) at Haldighat in the Aravalli Hills, where the Sisodias had withdrawn from Chittor. In fact, many Rajput  chiefs  served Akbar’s successors Jehangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb  and helped in expanding the empire further south into the Deccan at the expense of the Bahmani Kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Berar, Bidar, Bijapur and Golconda.

Maharana Pratap on grey steed ” Chetak” at Haldighat (1576)

Events leading to the Third Battle of Panipat: 

Disintegration of the Mughal empire set in after the iron rule of Aurangzeb ended in 1707 and invaders again started streaming in over the Himalayas, attracted by the immense wealth of the Indo-Gangetic plain. In 1739, Nadir Shah of Persia sacked Delhi, humiliated the Great Mughal and carried off the exquisite Kohinoor Diamond (now in the Tower of London) and Shah Jahan’s fabulous Peacock Throne! After Nadir Shah was murdered in 1747, his general Ahmed Shah Abdali of the Durrani clan became the first Emir of Afghanistan. He formed an army of freebooters, and invaded North India 7 times, looting and killing.     

Meanwhile, a powerful new force was rising south of the Vindhyas. Aurangzeb’s viceroy, maternal uncle Shaista Khan was successfully challenged in the Sahyadris (Western Ghats) by Maratha leader Shivaji Bhonsle who was crowned Maharaja in 1674. His grandson Shahu Maharaj, appointed Balaji Viswanath, a Chitpavan Brahmin from the Konkan Coast, as Peshwa or Chief Minister.  On his death in 1720, his young son Baji Rao was appointed Peshwa. He proved to be an capable administrator and a brilliant general and swept across the Deccan and Central/Western India, ably assisted by his brother Chimaji Appa, terrorizing Mughal Viceroys while the Emperor cowered in the Red Fort. The popular doggerel of those times runs, “From Delhi to Palam, is the realm of Shah Alam.” After Baji Rao saved Raja Chatrasaal of Bundelkand from invaders, he was given the hand of Mastani, the Raja’s daughter from Ruhani, a Persian beauty. The apocryphal story line of the movie “Bajirao Mastani” about their torrid romance is widely accepted, though this second marriage of the Peshwa, may well have been just a political arrangement.   Baji Rao was succeeded in 1740 by his son Balaji Baji Rao, better known as Nanasaheb, who focussed his attention on the Deccan but was forced into action when Holkar and Scindia, the Maratha Sirdars in North India implored him to help them against Abdali in 1759.                                          

The Third Battle of Panipat, 1761

The Third Battle of Panipat was fought on 14th January, 1761 between Abdali’s marauders and the Maratha army of the Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao (Nanasaheb).  Peshwa Baji Rao’s first wife was Kashibhai and their two sons were Nanasaheb and Reghunath Rao. The second wife a Muslim, Mastani bore a son, Krishna Rao who later became a Muslim renaming himself as Shamsher Bahadur, after the Brahmins of Poona refused to accept him. After Baji Rao’s death and that of his brother (and alter ego) Chimaji Appa in 1740, the latter’s son Sadasivrao(Bhau), successfully led the Deccan armies of Peshwa  Nanasaheb, who was no military leader, unlike his great father. Shamsher Bahadur was cared for by his stepmother Kashibai and became a leading chief in his step-brother’s army with the title, Nawab of Banda, through his mother’s lineage. (His descendant, the last Nawab of Banda fought alongside Rani Lakshmibhai of Jhansi, and Tantia Topi at Kalpi in 1858)

Peshwa Family Tree

The other leading Sirdars, Admiral Khanoji Angre (Konkan Coast), Gaikwad (Baroda), Bhonsle (Nagpur), Holkar (Indore), Scindia (Gwalior) governed separate satrapies more or less under the Peshwa. And all were nominally under the titular Maratha head, the Maharaja at Kolhapur, direct descendent of Shivaji Maharaj. Relations between the Maharaja, his Peshwa and the satraps were rather complex but each exercised control and levied chauth tax (1/4th revenue) in separate regions and all came together against common enemies. Scindia and Holkar were naturally the ones directly impacted by Abdali’s raids in North India.

Peshwa Nanasaheb was at the zenith of his glory after cousin Sadasivrao’s victory at Udgir over the Nizam of Hyderabad on 3rd February, 1759.  In September, news reached him in Poona’s magnificent Shaniwarwada Palace (built by Bajirao) from Dattaji Scindia, of Abdali’s latest incursion into Punjab. The Peshwa himself was terminally ill with TB and the other Maratha chiefs were each busy with his own project - Raghoji Bhonsle pushing towards Allahabad, Damaji Gaekwad in Gujarat, Dattaji Scindia raiding the Rohillas of the Doab and also extracting chauth tribute from the Rajput rulers. Malharrao Holkar was at loggerheads with Jat Raja Surajmal of Bharatpur who had killed his only son, Khanderao (husband of Ahalyabai who in the future would rule Indore with great distinction). Mughal Emperor Shah Alam and his Wazir, Imad ud daula intrigued against each other and both invited Abdali and the Peshwa to intervene. Altogether a most opportune moment for the Afghan to invade a divided land.

Shaniwarwada Palace, Poona

The Peshwa entrusted the onerous task of fighting the Afghan gilchas to cousin Sadasivrao Bhau, with his own 17 year old son and heir Viswasrao, as nominal commander. Sadasivrao Bhau, already Dewan of the Peshwa was now given the additional position of Sardar Senapati. At 30, he was a competent and experienced general who had begun his military career at the age of 16 by defeating the Nawab of Savanur in several battles in Karnataka. He had recently evolved a new war strategy for the Maratha army which had hitherto totally relied on guerilla tactics and hit and run cavalry charges to harass less mobile enemies. Ibrahim Khan’s Gardi musketeers and heavy cannons, which had played a major role at Udgir were inducted into the Peshwa’s army. These 11,000 Telangi Gardis were armed with the latest matchlock muskets, were disciplined and had been well trained in the European manner by the French officer Charles de Bussy in Hyderabad. Though paid mercenaries, they were totally loyal to their paymasters. Portents for success seemed bright as the rest of the 45,000-man Maratha army was strong in cavalry, especially the Peshwa’s superbly mounted Huzurathorse guards (10,000 in number) and 15,000 highly mobile Pindari (Hindu/Muslim outlaws) horsemen, who were excellent scouts and skirmishers.

Charging Maratha Horsemen

But there were glaring weaknesses in the Maratha campaign plan. Behind the scenes, both Gopikabhai and Raghunath Rao (wife and brother of the Peshwa) intrigued to undermine Sadasivrao Bhau. Moreover, the Senapati though undoubtedly brave and innovative, had never commanded armies in Hindustan proper (north of the Narmada) and was totally unfamiliar with the terrain / politics / people / personalities / culture / dialects of North India. Quite unlike Abdali who knew the North Indian terrain like the back of his hand and was on friendly terms with many rulers there.  Bhau’s  hubris, resulting from early military success and popular adulation, made him rash, overbold and totally lacking in diplomacy. He foolishly yielded to the emotional plea of his wife Parvathibhai that she should be allowed to accompany him on this dangerous campaign in order to visit pilgrim sites in the North! He obviously had no idea that war outside the Deccan was a different ball game - violent, visceral and vicious. Many high born ladies of Poona also wanted to go too, on this extended picnic into the polarized minefield that was North India.  Eventually, nearly 60,000 non-combatants (wives, maids, priests, attendants, retainers, syces, cooks, grooms, barbers, tailors, cobblers, musicians,) accompanied the 45,000 fighting men resulting  in a totally unacceptable teeth to tail ratio. And they carried luxurious tents, palanquins, furniture, utensils, provisions, in hundreds of bullock carts, slowing down the Maratha army whose main strength had always been its mobility and ability to travel light.

And Sadasivrao took his time to get started, though he should have realized the need for urgency. Probably the delay was also due to acute shortage of money since the Peshwa after a long delay, finally came up with only Rs 6 lakhs in cash and a hundi for Rs 3 lakhs, encashable at Indore, against a projected requirement of 50 lakhs. Obviously, Nanasaheb expected his army to live off the land even though it would create friction with the local rulers. Sadasivrao finally started from Sindhked, near Aurangabad, on 15th March 1760. But the situation had deteriorated considerably in the interim 6 month period, as the unsupported Scindias were surprised by Abdali at the Barari Ghat crossing of the Yamuna. Dattaji Scindia was killed and Jankoji and Sabaji were wounded and fled south to join Malharrao Holkar.       

The flower of Maratha chivalry accompanied Senapati Sadasivrao and Viswasrao, namely Shamsher Bahadur (Baji Rao/Mastani’s son), Yashwantrao Pawar, Damaji Gaikwad, Balwantrao Mehendele, Manaji Paygude. While the Scindias and Holkars were already engaging Abdali in the North, the Nagpur Bhonsles, inexplicably, did not join the expedition. Proceeding at a leisurely pace, Bhau crossed the Narmada on 18th April with some difficulty and reached Gwalior on 1st June where Malharrao Holkar and the Jat Raja Surajmal of Bharatpur joined him. Though inimical to each other, they jointly suggested leaving the heavy cannons behind. Sadasivrao would have none of it since his new tactics relied very much on these powerful new weapons. An almighty row resulted between these 3 men with outsize egos, resulting in fatal consequences for Bhau and his army, in the not too distant future. Early monsoons made it extremely difficult for the heavy Gardi cannons to make it across the Chambal ravines but they somehow managed to reach Agra on 14th July.  The 900 mile Sindhked-Agra journey had taken 120 days!  (See map of Bhau’s route)

Sadasiva Rao Bhau's route map

Raja Surajmal and Holkar went ahead to capture  Delhi which they promptly did on 1st August, brushing aside the scanty forces which Abdali had left there. Sadasivrao meanwhile, sensibly opened negotiations with Abdali, who had moved east to the Ganga-Yamuna Doab. Fruitlessly though, since the Marathas wanted the Indus River as the border, while Abdali stuck firmly to his demand for Sirhind as the boundary. At this juncture, Surajmal left in a huff since Sadasivrao refused to give him control of Delhi.  Sadasivrao was now left sans any allies or friends in a strange land since the Marathas had already antagonized natural allies like the Rajput chiefs, by levying chauth subsidy and interfering in their local politics. Even the Sikhs who were unflinching enemies of the Afghans, were not enthusiastic about supporting the haughty Marathas. Abdali on the other hand, strategically tied up with the Rohilla chiefs Najib Khan (Sahranpur) and Dunde Khan (Bareilly) who controlled the fertile ‘Doab’ between the Ganga and Yamuna rivers.  Though a radical Sunni, Abdali even got Nawab Shuja of Awadh, a Shia, on his side through clever diplomacy! He was also adept at working on erstwhile allies of the Marathas sending emissaries across India with peace offerings, gifts and promises.

Ahmed Sahah Abdali (1722-1772)    &    Sadasivarao Bhau (1730-1761)

Ibrahim Khan Gardi at siege of Kunjpura Fort

The Marathas were running short of food and decided to move north from Delhi towards fertile Punjab, where the Sikhs were not unfriendly. It was also planned partly as a pilgrimage (!) to the sacred field of Kurukshetra. Reaching Karnal, 110 kms from Delhi, they were just 20 kms from Kunjpura Fort on the west bank of the Yamuna, which was held by a large Afghan force. The huge Gardi guns blasted the Fort and the musketeers stormed in through the breach, followed by the Maratha horsemen who massacred 7000 Afghans, while Abdali watched helplessly from the eastern side of the flooded Yamuna. A few days later, Abdali found a ford near Baghpat, and crossed to the west bank, to confront the Marathas who were holding Panipat fort to the north. A waiting “cat and mouse” game went on for over 2 months, with the Marathas getting desperate from starvation, having over 100,000 mouths to feed. The freezing cold too, affected the Southerners who were unaccustomed to the Northern winter and did not even have warm clothing. Scouting for supplies was dangerous since Afghan horsemen were scouring the both sides of the Yamuna.

The death of aged warrior Govind Pant Bundela, a key aide of Bhau, in a skirmish near Ghaziabad on 20th December 1760, dealt a massive blow to Maratha morale. He had gone across the Yamuna into the Doab, mainly to cut supplies from Najib Khan’s Rohilkand territory which replenished Abdali’s army.  

All along, Sadasivrao had been making frantic appeals to the Peshwa for men, material and money, appeals which fell on deaf ears. Bhausaheb, as he was called, suggested to the Peshwa, that negotiations be opened immediately with Abdali. Unfortunately, Nanasaheb had delusions of his father’s glory and refused to give up any territory won by Baji Rao! His illness had totally crippled his thinking and distracted him. He dawdled at Paithan to contract a marriage with a 9 year old girl and finally started moving north with an army only on 31st December, 1760.  Alas, too late to save his army left stranded and unsupported in the north. 

Battle Plan for the Third Battle of Panipat. Situation at 1 pm

Facing southwards between Panipat Fort and the Yamuna river, the Maratha army was well entrenched and Ibrahim Khan Gardi’s 120 heavy artillery and 11,000 musketeers made this position well-nigh impregnable.  Frequent skirmishes took place between the horsemen on either side but the presence of the 60,000 noncombatants made the Maratha camp vulnerable. Though sorely short of food, the predominantly vegetarian Marathas would not eat their draught bullocks and were soon starving and immobile too, with no fodder for their horses. Growing bolder, the Afghans even took back hard-won Kunjpura Fort, skirting Panipat. But Abdali knew that the Maratha position around Panipat Fort was too strong to take by frontal assault. He was in no hurry to attack since he was well supplied from the south and east and sat astride the Marathas’ route to Delhi and the south. Negotiations, mostly initiated and brokered by Nawab Shuja, a moderate Shia, came to naught since Najib Khan, whose advice fellow Sunni Abdali relied on, was totally against peace with the arrogant kafirs. He was also afraid of a Maratha backlash, if Abdali left India without cutting them to size.    

On the night of 13th January, 1761 (Makar Sankranti, Winter Solstice) the Maratha commanders met to take stock of the desperate situation. Ibrahim Khan Gardi mooted the idea of forming a huge “hollow square” with the non-combatants safe in the centre and 120 Gardi cannons in front blasting the north-facing Afghans and moving obliquely towards the southeast. The plan was that on reaching the Yamuna, 12 kilometers away, they would push along it, south to Delhi, which was still held by the Marathas. These were sound European-style tactics in the manner of Frederick the Great, which Ibrahim Khan had probably imbibed from his mentor Charles de Bussy (Wellington in 1815 against Napoleon at Waterloo, made his infantry form similar “hollow squares” to resist French cavalry charges). But the complex movements called for strict discipline and training which only the Gardis and the Huzurat cavalry possessed. Considering the desperate situation, the risky plan was nevertheless endorsed by the other leaders (despite objections from Holkar and Jankoji Scindia) and duly approved by Senapati Sadasivrao. The Marathas were forced to adopt the “hollow square formation” as the only way to evacuate the 60,000 noncombatants and probably hoped that Abdali would choose to avoid a horrendous clash and allow them to move unhindered to Delhi.  In fact, neither side was really confident of winning outright. Late night messages were sent to all Maratha units to take up their assigned positions early the next day. Bhau also made a midnight effort for peace through Shuja’s minister Kasi Raj. But the appeal failed to move Abdali.  Conflict was now inevitable and pre-dawn preparations in the Maratha camp became apparent to the Afghans. Initial positioning of different units of the opposing armies is detailed in the battle plan given above.

At  9 in the morning, the Gardi cannons and musketeers started moving laterally south-east, with the rest of the Maratha forces following. Sadasivrao’s last meal was a tumbler of Jaggery-sweetened water! Immediately, Dunde Khan on Abdali’s right wing, led his 14000 Rohillas and 3000 Persian cavalry of Barkudar Khan to block their movement, forcing them to face south. This traditional face to face engagement resulted in the smaller Maratha army being outflanked in the far west. Now Bhau and Viswasrao with the elite huzurat cavalry were in the centre, with Gardis to their left and Holkars and Scindias to their right. The 45,000 South-facing Marathas and their mounts were half- starved and had the disadvantage of facing a winter sun positioned in the south.   

Abdali’s 55,000 strong army, facing north, was aligned east-west along the Sanauli Road with Shah Pasand Khan’s 3000 Afghan horsemen on the extreme left and Najib’s 15000 Rohillas next to them. Nawab Shuja of Awadh held the centre with 60 cannons, supported by 20,000 Afghan cavalry under Abdali’s Wazir, Shah Wali Khan. In the array, Abdali cunningly alternated Indian chiefs with his own Afghan generals to prevent treachery. He himself commanded from the rear centre, atop an elephant, surrounded by his 3000 strong Slave Battalion. Though his position, away from the din of battle, was later deemed as cowardly by Maratha historians, he had a clear strategic view of the battle and could direct his forces appropriately. In contrast to Sadasivrao and Viswasrao who were not only physically vulnerable to attack, but also unable to have an overall picture of the battle, being in the thick of the melee. Unfortunately, till quite recently, leaders were expected to lead from the front, though Abdali was a clear exception.  The initial artillery barrage went in favour of the Marathas and then the Gardi musketeers in the east routed Dunde Khan’s Rohilla horsemen. Sadasivrao and Viswasrao, mounted on elephants, led the Peshwa’s Huzurat Household Cavalry in a furious charge on the Wazir’s Afghan horsemen with cries of “Jai Bhavani” and “Har Har Mahadev” and drove them back.

The site of the Last Stand of Sadasivrao

Epitaph at Kaala Aamb

Though Najib Khan’s Rohillas in the west fought off Jankoji Scindia, the Afghan line was split down the centre. At 1 pm it looked as if the Marathas were winning, as fierce warriors fought each other furiously with sword, spear, musket and dagger.  But, in the east, the slow moving bullock drawn Gardi cannons could not keep up with the musketeers and in the centre the Huzurat horses were tired and winded after their fierce 3 mile charge and were unable to consolidate their initial advantage. A gap opened up between the Huzurat and the Gardis to their left. Intuitively sensing the moment, Abdali let loose his reserve of 3000 Qizilbash musketeers and 1500 camel-mounted guns which could shoot over their own men into the Huzurat ranks.

At 4 pm, Sadasivrao had no reserves to call upon. Viswasrao, fighting from his howdah, was killed by a stray bullet to his head. A desperate Sadasivrao descended from his elephant to lead several furious charges on his Arab horse “Pari”, into the enemy ranks. But many Maratha soldiers, seeing the 2 empty howdahs lost heart assuming that both their leaders were slain. (It is curious that Indian generals didn’t learn from history and recklessly exposed themselves in the vanguard, on elephant back - Hemu in 1556, and Rama Raya at Talikota in 1565 were shot down.) At this juncture, 3000 renegade Afghans fighting on the Maratha side, threw off their saffron head dress and joined Abdali’s forces. Sadasivrao had 3 horses killed under him and young Nana Phadnis describes how “with the proud disdain which characterised all his actions”  he fought and died. His ego was certainly more than matched by his “izzat” and valour. His headless torso was found in the heap of bodies, under the “Kaala Aamb” mango tree which turned black from the blood of the slain! The withered tree trunk is in the Panipat museum but there is a monument to mark the site of the last brave stand of Sadasivrao Bhau and the Peshwa’s gallant Huzurat. The flower of Maratha youth fell with him, including Shamsher Bahadur, 27 year old son of Baji Rao and Mastani. The tragic message to the Peshwa read in Marathi, “Two pearls have been dissolved; 27 goldmohurs were lost; and of silver and copper, there is no count.” Most of the 11000 Southern Telangi Gardis fell, fighting bravely in a lost cause. Young Jankoji Scindia and Ibrahim Khan Gardi were wounded and captured. Despite Nawab Shuja’s efforts to save them, they were executed by an enraged Abdali, prodded by the wily Rohilla, Najib Khan. Mahadji Scindia, though badly wounded, was carried off by a Muslim water-carrier and went on to an illustrious military career, as depicted in the TV serial Great Maratha.

While Jankoji Scindia had fought bravely on the Maratha right of centre and there was desperate fighting in the centre and east, Malharrrao Holkar in the extreme west, shamefully did not even wait to come into conflict with the battle-hardened Afghan troops facing and threatening to outflank him (See Battle Plan) In the movie Panipat, Malharrao Holkar is shown as leaving the battlefield to rescue Parvatibhai, but all evidence suggests that he fled with his 6000 men before even coming into action! The gap thus caused in the west in the Maratha array enabled Pasand Khan and Najib to wheel around to surround Bhau and the Huzurat, already desperately fighting off attacks on two fronts.

Sadasivrao became a legend. As the Marathi ballad goes :                 

They left him not who loved him

But fighting round him died

While traitors, with their spoils secure

Towards the Deccan ride.

Bhau’s wife Parvatibhai was abandoned by her bodyguards but saved by a servant Janu Bhintada, who carried her part of the way. She was luckily found by the fleeing Holkar and taken to the safety of Gwalior and on to Poona, where she lived long, refusing to accept the reality of her husband’s death. Survivors Mahadji Scindia and Nana Phadnis played a major role in the partial Maratha revival later.

Very few soldiers managed to escape and most were taken prisoner and 20,000 slaughtered the next day. Nearly 25,000 women, many of high rank, were taken back as slaves to Afghanistan. There was an article in Sunday Indian in 2013 about a community of “Road Marathas”, descendants of survivors who were ashamed to go back home to Poona. They follow Maratha customs, reside in the Panipat region and meet regularly at Kaala Aamb memorial, site of the last stand of Sadasivrao Bhau. After Abdali’s pyrrhic victory where he lost over 10,000 men, he found it difficult to hold on to the territories he had won, especially against the rising power of the Sikhs who under Jussa Singh Ahluwalia defeated him in 1762. It is interesting that no other invader after Abdali ever came over the Himalayas into India. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Marathas were the first South Indian power ever, to occupy substantial territory north of the Vindhyas, if you discount the Cholas’ brief excursion to the Ganga circa 1000 AD.

The 3rd battle of Panipat was an encounter that the Marathas would have won but for glaring political, strategic and tactical mistakes and their managing to alienate every ruler in north India. While still moving slowly north with a supporting army, Peshwa Nanasaheb received the terrible tidings at Jhansi. Totally broken-hearted, he immediately opened negotiations with Abdali through Holkar, something he could (and should) have done before the catastrophe. He returned to Poona and died on 23rd June at the temple on Parvati Hill.  His successor Peshwas were no longer able to exercise much control over the Maratha Sirdars. Therefore, in the 3 Anglo-Maratha Wars, the British never had to face a unified Maratha Confederacy. Lord Lake, and Arthur Wellesley (later Duke of Wellington) defeated Scindia, Holkar, Bhonsle, Gaikwad separately. Finally, Peshwa Baji Rao II was defeated at Bhima-Koregaon, near Poona on 1st January 1818. The sordid drama following the 200th anniversary celebrations of this battle by the descendants of the victorious Mahars (who fought on the British side) is still playing out. The British under Robert Clive, had begun by beating the French and dominating the Carnatic. Clive then won at Plassey against Nawab Sirajud daula of Bengal in 1757. Tippu Sultan, the only strong ruler left, was killed at Srirangpatnam  in 1799, with the Nizam of Hyderabad and even the  Marathas helping the British. In short, resistance to the British was piecemeal as they subjugated one ruler after another. Till 1857, when many of their 320,000 sepoys revolted and were joined by several others like Nanasaheb of Bithur( adopted son of Baji Rao II), Rani Lakshmibhai, Tantia Tope, …. nominally in support of the last Moghul Bahadur Shah Zafar. Alas, it was too little, too late, as most of their 600 subsidiary allies (Gwalior, Baroda, Jaipur, Udaipur, Travancore,…) stood rock solid with the British and  managed to save their kingdoms and their lives!                                                                                                                                

The major setback in 1761 at Panipat to the Marathas, the only Indian super power of the mid 1700s, thus left a vacuum setting the stage for the rise of the East India Company and the foundation of Britain’s Empire in Asia. It is fascinating to speculate on the “Ifs” of History, of what might have been. What one wonders, would have been the course of Indian History, if Sadasivrao had defeated Ahmed Shah Abdali at Panipat on 14th January, 1761?

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