Lessons from the Thioklol Woodbine Disaster
This February 3rd marks the 53nd anniversary (1971) of the Thiokol Chemical Plant explosion, a disaster that took the lives of 29 people, shattered a community, and led to a frightening Department of Defense discovery.
Founded in 1963, the Woodbine-Thiokol Chemical Plant produced and tested rocket engines for Cape Canaveral on their 7,400-acre property near Woodbine, Georgia. As the US space program began curbing its solid-fuel propellant budget in 1965, the plant was forced to explore other avenues in order to make ends meet. Notably, as the Civil Rights movement gained a foothold in the early 1960’s, the Thiokol Chemical Plant became the first fully-integrated co-ed workplace in American history (The Thiokol Memorial Project, 2015).
With 36 buildings sprawling the property, its layout made it an ideal candidate for a munitions factory, a bid which it won with the US Army in 1969 to make trip-flares and other similar products in support of the Vietnam War effort.
“The trip flare provides warning of infiltrating troops by illuminating the field when the trip wire is activated. It puts out a light intensity of 35,000 candlepower for one minute; it can also be activated by trigger or pull pin.” (Picatinny Arsenal, n.d.)
Trip flares are produced through the combination of hazardous materials such as Magnesium and Potassium Nitrate. When set alight, they burn at about 2,500°F and are nearly impossible to extinguish. Up until 1967, these devices were classified as Class 7 hazards – the highest possible classification not including biological or nuclear materials. In 1967, that classification got mistakenly downgraded to Class 2 – which would put it in line with compressed gasses – a grave mistake. During the entirety of its production cycle at Thiokol, management had been under the impression that these materials were less hazardous than they really were. It took nearly 3 years for the Army to realize their mistake and set corrective measures in 1970 to reassign these flares back to Class 7, a message that was received just over 3 weeks after the disaster (Kerr, J.-L., 2010).
The Alert Sheet attached to Thiokol's contract specified that the flares manufactured at Woodbine, at least with respect to the end item storage and transportation, were classified as Class 2 (United States Courts of Appeals, 1979).
“On November 16, 1970, Army Material Command approved the recommendation to classify illuminants as Class 7. Under standard operating procedure, this change would have been communicated to all operating levels of the procurement process. Accordingly, the directive would have been sent to Thiokol, with a copy to DCASR in Atlanta.
Instead, nothing happened. Not until February 25, 1971, three weeks after the explosion, did the Commanding Officer of Picatinny inform the General Manager of Thiokol-Woodbine that on an interim basis "it is recommended" that loose illuminant be reclassified as Class 7. Only on March 25, 1971, was Thiokol notified that all pyrotechnic materials, in storage or in process, "Must be considered as explosive Hazard Class 7 . . ." (emphasis added). It is not clear what happened between November 16 and February 25. But the upgrading order was found in the desk drawer of an officer of Picatinny's research lab some time after the explosion in Building M-132.” (United States Courts of Appeals, 1979).
Although it started as a small fire, it rapidly became uncontainable and untenable. At 10:53 a.m. (Collins & Wheeler, 1971) building M132 went up in flames – causing a roar heard for miles in and around Coastal Georgia (Cox, 1971). Although its underlying ignition point is unknown, the fire quickly spread down a line of ingredients including 23,000 pounds of high explosives (United States Courts of Appeals, 1979). The explosion that followed destroyed the facility and its nearby buildings – killing 29 and injuring about 100 others.
In all, hundreds of local emergency responders, hospital staff, Navy, Army and Airforce personnel, local pilots and state and federal employees took part in the response and recovery operations that followed (The Thiokol Memorial Project, 2015).
To this day, it remains one of the deadliest workplace accidents in United States history. And it was totally preventable.
It has also, at least until recently, been almost completely forgotten. Today, the recently founded Thiokol Memorial Museum and Foundation have sought to preserve the memories, artifacts and history of the plant, its Civil Rights importance and the disaster that ended its physical presence. In 2019 the Georgia State Legislature designated Exit 7 on I-95 (near Harriet’s Bluff Road) as the Patriots of Thiokol Memorial Interchange.
In the resulting lawsuits that followed the damage, injuries and fatalities from the explosion, the courts found that a root cause of the catastrophe was that the plant was operating under incorrect safety standards – not by their own fault – but, rather, by the United States Department of Defense (United States Courts of Appeals, 1979). Today, we still rely upon governance bodies like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the United Nations International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) to identify, characterize, update, and review the classifications of hazardous materials like explosives.
When looking back on the Thiokol-Woodbine Disaster, it took many years for the United States military to note the critical and extremely dangerous mistake they made in downgrading the Class 7 materials to Class 2. It is therefore important to remember that even today, many hazard classification governing boards such as OSHA and the IATG only conduct reviews every 5 years (OSHA, n.d. & United Nations, 2021). Consequently, the question could be asked: Have we put too much trust in these governing bodies to create and maintain sufficient minimum standards for life-safety hazards when they are only reviewed twice a decade?
Remembering Woodbine Documentary:
AP Footage Reel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQReQRJkr38&
Podcast: https://omny.fm/shows/tripwire/tripwire-episode-7-remembering-woodbine
TripWire Panel Discussion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkW9ko4IgEQ
Celia Alberta, Ethel Banks, Annie C. Booth, Gloria W. Booth, Bertha R. Brunswick, Bettie R. Burch, Charles Burch, James L. Chapman, Yvonne M. Connelly, Jack Cox, Mae H. Davis, Mildred Davis, Howard Ellis, Sr., Willie M. Fuller, Pearlie M. Hutchinson, Annie M. James, Mack Kennedy, Essie D. King, Gracie M. Life, Bertha M. Hill, Charles T. Monak, James Parland, Sandra R. Rauls, Cyrus D. Roberson, Betty J. Roberts, Lillie B. Spells, Cheryl M. Sullivan, Mae A. Taylr, Joseph E. Wainright & Annie L. Williams
Collins, B., & Wheeler, C. (1971, February 7). Local People Guessed Roar Was Thiokol. The Atlanta Journal, 2. https://www.newspapers.com/image/971620964/?terms=thiokol&match=1
Cox, C. (1971, February 7). The Week at a Glance. The Atlanta Constitution , 77. https://www.newspapers.com/image/398532481/?terms=thiokol%20explosion&match=1
Kerr, J.-L. (2010). A Look Back: Huge blast in ’71 obliterated Woodbine chemical plant. The Florida Times-Union. https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/2010/10/18/look-back-huge-blast-71-obliterated-woodbine-chemical-plant/15928186007/
OSHA. (n.d.). Occupational Safety and Health Standards (Part 1910, Subpart H). Occupational Safety and Health Administration. https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1910/1910.119
Picatinny Arsenal. (n.d.). M49 Surface Trip Flare: PD Support Munitions . Project Manager Close Combat Systems. https://web.archive.org/web/20130307015734/https://www.pica.army.mil/pmccs/supportmunitions/flares/SurfaceTrip.html
Thiokol Memorial Project. (2015). The Thiokol Plant History. Thiokol Memorial Project. http://thiokolmemorial.org/the-thiokol-plant-explosion/
United Nations. (2021). UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes (IATG 01.50:2021[E]; International Ammunition Technical Guidelines). https://data.unsaferguard.org/iatg/en/IATG-01.50-Explosive-hazard-classification-system-IATG-V.3.pdf
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit: 604 F.2d 417, No. 78-3615 (United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit October 15, 1979). https://web.archive.org/web/20120310145415/http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/604/604.F2d.417.78-3615.html
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