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Poetry as an AI test? Where have I heard that before... oh yeah, this in this classic

https://redirect.cs.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf

The relevant quote:

This argument is very, well expressed in Professor Jefferson's Lister Oration for 1949,

from which I quote. "Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto

because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we

agree that machine equals brain-that is, not only write it but know that it had written it.

No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance)

pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made

miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get

what it wants."

This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most

extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that machine thinks

is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings

to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise

according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular

man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it

makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe "A thinks but B does not"

whilst B believes "B thinks but A does not." instead of arguing continually over this point

it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks.

I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist point

of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test. The

game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice under the name of viva

voce to discover whether some one really understands something or has "learnt it parrot

fashion." Let us listen in to a part of such a viva voce:

Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads "Shall I compare thee to a

summer's day," would not "a spring day" do as well or better?

Witness: It wouldn't scan.

Interrogator: How about "a winter's day," That would scan all right.

Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day

Interrogator: How about "a winter's day," That would scan all right.

Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day.

Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas?

Witness: In a way.

Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would

mind the comparison.

Witness: I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day one means a typical winter's day,

rather than a special one like Christmas.

And so on, What would Professor Jefferson say if the sonnet-writing machine was able to

answer like this in the viva voce? I do not know whether he would regard the machine as

"merely artificially signalling" these answers, but if the answers were as satisfactory and

sustained as in the above passage I do not think he would describe it as "an easy

contrivance." This phrase is, I think, intended to cover such devices as the inclusion in

the machine of a record of someone reading a sonnet, with appropriate switching to turn

it on from time to time.

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